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2 **Legal ontology of sales law application**
3 **to ecommerce**

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7 **Abstract.** Legal codes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) examined in this article, are
8 good points of entry for AI and ontology work because of their more straightforward adaptability
9 to relationship linking and rules-based encoding. However, approaches relying on encoding solely
10 on formal code structure are incomplete, missing the rich experience of practitioner expertise that
11 identifies key relationships and decision criteria often supplied by experienced practitioners and
12 process experts from various disciplines (e.g., sociology, political economics, logistics, operations
13 research). This research focuses on the UCC because it transcends the limitations of a formal code,
14 functioning essentially as a composite. AI work can benefit from real-world codes like the UCC,
15 which are essentially formal codes enlightened from a more realistic experience-base from centuries
16 of development in international commercial transactions settings. This paper then describes our
17 initial work in converting an expert system on the U.S. law governing the sale of goods from
18 Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), into a knowledge-based system using the Web
19 Ontology Language OWL.

20 **Key words:** legal ontology, uniform commercial code

21

22 **1. Introduction**

24 Artificial intelligence (AI) techniques have spread only slowly into the
25 domains of law, regulation and public policy. From time to time, prototype
26 expert systems are devised but many provide, at best, mixed results. The
27 perspective of this research is that artificial intelligence in law is inherently
28 interdisciplinary. Successful projects in artificial intelligence and ontologies
29 require domain expertise in both law and artificial intelligence. Domain
30 expertise in law is derived from two sources: legal experts in the formal law
31 and process theorists representing various disciplines. Codes, such as the
32 Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) examined in this article, are good points
33 of entry for AI and ontology work because of their more straightforward
34 adaptability to relationship linking and rules-based encoding. However,



35 approaches relying on encoding solely on formal code structure are incom-
 36 plete, missing the rich experience of practitioner expertise that identifies key
 37 relationships and decision criteria often supplied by experienced practitioners
 38 and process experts from various disciplines (e.g., sociology, political eco-
 39 nomics, logistics, operations research). This research focuses on the UCC
 40 because it transcends the limitations of many formal codes, functioning
 41 essentially as a composite largely due to the UCC's rather unique heritage.
 42 The UCC was derived from the Law Merchant and Lex Mercatoria, codi-
 43 fications of actual practice rather than normative codes drafted by inexpe-
 44 rienced legislators. Therefore, AI work on real-world codes like the UCC is
 45 benefited by the straightforward coding advantages of codes but enlightened
 46 with a more realistic experience-base from centuries of development in
 47 international commercial transactions settings. This paper then describes our
 48 initial work in converting an expert system on parts of the law governing the
 49 sale of goods, Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), into a
 50 knowledge-based system using the Web Ontology Language OWL with Jess
 51 as our inference engine.

52 2. Related Work

53 Legal ontologies are a key technology enabling semantic representation and
 54 reasoning about legal domains (Schweighofer and Liebwald 2005). Research
 55 on extending standard ontologies into the legal domain span the range from
 56 core ontologies (e.g., LRI-Core, Breuker 2004), normative ontologies (e.g.,
 57 NM-L, Shaheed et al. 2005), professional legal knowledge ontologies (e.g.,
 58 OPJK, Casanovas et al. 2005), or focused on sub-domains ontologies such as
 59 intellectual property rights (Gil et al. 2005). Additional challenges arise when
 60 considering the multi-language aspects of legal terms (Peters et al. 2005).
 61 These ontologies provide the ability to incorporate social and organizational
 62 roles and responsibilities (Royakkers et al. 2005; Boella and van der Torre
 63 2005), causal relationships (Hoekstra and Breuker 2005), and norms (Boer
 64 et al. 2005) are required to support sound representation and reasoning. In
 65 our UCC domain, the ability to represent and reason about roles is crucial.
 66 Buyers and sellers, merchants and non-merchants have different roles, rights,
 67 and responsibilities in commercial transactions. For example, merchants are
 68 assumed to have more knowledge and resources to anticipate and to address
 69 any issues that arise during commercial activities. In addition, commercial
 70 activities generally involve collective organizational obligations. Hafner
 71 (Hafner 1987) has described aspects of conceptual organization necessary in
 72 the UCC domain, including the domain knowledge model. Finally, legal
 73 tools and methodologies are needed to support the general adoption of this
 74 research. The eGanges system (Gray 2005) provides a legal expert shell



75 environment, and LODE (Aoki et al. 1998) is a legal ontology development
 76 tool. TERMINAE provides a construction methodology (Despres and
 77 Szulman 2005) for composing micro-ontologies into a single composite
 78 ontology. LawBot uses agents and ontology-augmented search to help those
 79 outside the legal profession acquire legal information (Debnath et al. 2000).

80 3. Some Commercial Successes in Developing Legal Ontologies

81 Despite the enormous hurdles to comprehensive and robust AI in the
 82 domains of law, regulation and public policy, some interesting experiments
 83 have been conducted and a few notable functional systems are operative.
 84 For example, there are some complex but deterministic systems successfully
 85 deployed in specific sub-domains of law, regulation and public policy. Con-
 86 sider the rules-based systems in commercially available tax preparation
 87 applications, some running as native software and others successfully oper-
 88 ating from online applications service providers (ASP) – the latter including
 89 government as the ASP: the United States (U.S.) Internal Revenue Service
 90 (IRS). Rather considerable progress in user assistance has characterized the
 91 primary legal research databases (Lexis, Westlaw) in the U.S. Online legal
 92 databases leverage the traditional categories in law and regulation, develop
 93 and deploy cross-reference links, expand computer-aided search through
 94 natural language, filters and sense-making. Moving from legal categories to
 95 legal ontologies is a non-trivial task that may be supported through the use of
 96 XML (Lachmayer and Hoffman 2005; Biagioli and Turchi 2005). Finally,
 97 there are numerous electronic government transaction processing systems
 98 throughout the world. For example, many taxing authorities assist taxpayers
 99 with AI technologies, licensing authorities process transactions, intellectual
 100 property (IP) authorities provide research assistance and manage complex
 101 processing of application transactions, grants of rights, ownership search, etc.

102 New services developed by legal research databases may be good predic-
 103 tors of successful AI and ontology work in law for three reasons. First, they
 104 already have deployed AI research assistance as discussed above. Second, as
 105 private-sector, for profit information service providers, they can be expected
 106 to invest in AI innovation where there is reliable cash flow potential. Third,
 107 they are already fulfilling the promise of AI in large, complex environments
 108 by providing context-sensitive advice on information seeking, including
 109 significant access to actual reliable sources. For example, the online legal
 110 database services have mechanized and are enhancing traditional finding
 111 strategies, although largely using variations and context sensitive enhance-
 112 ments of key word in context search and retrieval. Nevertheless, these ser-
 113 vices are adding functionality, such as natural language queries rather than
 114 exclusively traditional Boolean approaches, with relevance prioritization and



115 reliability measures, and pragmatic resumption of prior line of research and
 116 reasoning. Of particular importance are context-sensitive and tangentially-
 117 linked relations to supplementary information. The most recent AI advances
 118 permit users to easily access context-sensitive and subject-sensitive informa-
 119 tion that broaden the user's understanding more efficiently and completely.
 120 AI contributes greatly to human expert analysis by organizing terabytes of
 121 esoteric information, providing mechanized search and retrieval and pro-
 122 viding expert assistance for further information seeking and retrieval.

123 4. Challenges Developing AI in Law

124 The development of more complex, reasoning-based applications in law,
 125 regulation and public policy may be impeded by the structure of legal
 126 knowledge. Law is generally unlike many other learned professions and
 127 scientific domains that have knowledge bases derived from empirical research
 128 and consensus heuristics generally proven to work well. Clearly law is an
 129 open-textured domain that requires more sophisticated AI techniques to
 130 classify, link and automate reasoning in the domains of law, regulation and
 131 public policy. For these reasons, further AI developments in law, regulation
 132 and public policy may require much more concentrated effort in representing
 133 legal rules, case interpretations and practitioner insights in ontologies.

134 There are constraints on expert systems and AI applications where they
 135 may impact the rights of individuals or entities. While judgments or decisions
 136 resulting from AI inference hold promise for improving human reasoning,
 137 particularly from the exhaustive capacity for search, it can be expected that
 138 early AI efforts in law will be imperfect as a complete substitute for the advice
 139 of experienced human practitioners (Hassett 2000). For example, Lamkin
 140 found that there may be legal liability for the owner or operator of an expert
 141 system in medical information and that this could lead to liability for mis-
 142 diagnosis or other treatment errors (Lamkin 1994). No reasonable basis for
 143 distinction from the medical context exists to shield AI systems in law from
 144 similar liability for information quality or even malpractice.

145 Judge Posner provides relevant clues into the difficulties any AI system
 146 will likely have in producing accurate predictions of legal outcomes or even
 147 helping to identify the reasoning that might lead to decisions in legislation,
 148 regulatory action or litigation. His comments are sobering for building
 149 ontologies with a primary view to providing efficient solutions, essentially
 150 relegating them to assistants useful in organizing and seeking information.

151 “The first step in deciding a tough antitrust case, a case not controlled
 152 by precedent, is to extract (not – it goes without saying – by a deductive
 153 process), from the relevant legislative texts and history, from the insti-



154 tutional characteristics of courts and legislatures, and, lacking definitive
 155 guidance from these sources, from a social vision as well, an overall
 156 concept of antitrust law to guide decision. ... All this is true; and it is
 157 right to emphasize, against the facile skepticism that is merely the
 158 opposite (and equally untenable) pole of syllogism-mongering, that even
 159 though interpretation is neither a logical nor a scientific process it yields
 160 true understandings in most cases, including most legal cases” (Posner
 161 1998).

162 Most of the existing AI experiments in law recognize that this enormity of
 163 legal knowledge is derived from formal law in constitutions, statutes and
 164 regulations; as interpreted by case law precedents; and finally interpreted
 165 through the experience of many domain experts. Law differs in states/prov-
 166 inces, among nations and between affiliated trading groups in international
 167 commerce. Law libraries are filled with statutes, legislative history, regula-
 168 tions and cases issued by thousands of discrete authorities. Nevertheless,
 169 undaunted, many computer and information scientists as well as legal
 170 scholars have chosen to break law down into manageable-sized sub-domains
 171 more susceptible to internal consistency and coherence and less effected by
 172 external domains. For example, Groothuis postulates that expert systems
 173 could be constructed to provide advice and decision support for sub-domains
 174 such as the government administered social insurance experiment in the
 175 Netherlands (Groothuis 2002). Another working experiment includes the
 176 decision support application of expert systems in New York to assist pros-
 177 ecutors in choosing from among many cases for the investment of resources
 178 such as investigators, attorneys and office staff (Hassett 2000). Yet another
 179 narrow domain example is the assessment of evidence in litigation by Levitt
 180 and Laskey (2001).

181 **5. Toward Legal Ontologies Accurately Reflecting both Formal Rules** 182 **and Actual Practice**

183 AI and ontologies in the law hold strong promise to organize legal research, as
 184 well as inform legal reasoning for improving the quality of legal decisions,
 185 advice and research. According to Rissland: “AI focuses a spotlight on issues
 186 of knowledge and process to a degree not found in non-computational
 187 approaches” (Rissland 1990). Accurate representation of the law is essential
 188 to meaningful and useful AI in law. According to Aikenhead “It is obviously a
 189 prerequisite to know what the nature of law is and what the process of legal
 190 reasoning involved before incorporating legal knowledge in a computer and
 191 making the computer manipulate that knowledge to emulate the legal
 192 reasoning process, i.e., the results achieved by lawyers” (Aikenhead 1996).



193 Legal ontologies become robust only in as much as they are able to enrich
 194 the more deterministic structure of context and interpretation available in
 195 statutory law. Case interpretations are a fundamental difference between the
 196 law of nations adhering to the common law approach (nations deriving legal
 197 traditions from England) and the nations using the civil law approach (nations
 198 adhering to the largely legislative approach of the continental European
 199 nations and the nations they colonized). In modern practice around the world,
 200 the governing statutes are the starting place for AI work.

201 There are two levels of domain knowledge beyond the formal statutory
 202 framework that are relevant for robust AI in law. First, the case law inter-
 203 pretations, just mentioned, add authoritative detail but are subject to inter-
 204 pretation. Second, heuristics of seasoned practitioners, regulators, litigators,
 205 judges, legislators, sociologists, and political economists can all provide rel-
 206 evant heuristics. For example, Aoki et al. used an existing general ontology
 207 enhanced by a case ontology automatically constructed from precedents input
 208 by the user in international commerce governed by the Vienna Convention on
 209 the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (Aoki et al. 1998).

210 By providing an explicit representation of the semantics for domain con-
 211 cepts and properties, ontologies can be used for knowledge sharing and reuse
 212 among both humans and software agents. In the Semantic Web vision (Berners-
 213 Lee et al. 2001), humans and computers can easily collaborate because the
 214 necessary information and process knowledge has been given a well-defined
 215 meaning that allows for intelligent automation by software agents. Research
 216 efforts in the legal domain, aimed at fostering a semantic web approach, have
 217 taken on the problem from two different, but complementary, directions.
 218 Kabilan and Johannesson (2003) focus on building a “lawyer’s ontology”.
 219 They conform to the legal terms and rules drawn from international contract
 220 law, and represent those in a conceptual model using the Unified Modeling
 221 Language¹ (UML). UML can then be transformed into various semantic web
 222 ontology languages. SweetDeal (Grosf and Poon 2003) embraces the “law in
 223 practice” or process-based approach based on actual practice for representing
 224 legal contracts. They use the MIT Process Handbook, which details business
 225 process knowledge actually used by industry business process designers, and
 226 represent the business process knowledge using semantic web languages such as
 227 DAML + OIL² and RuleML.³ With this information accessible, intelligent
 228 software agents can play a larger potential role in automating creating,
 229 assessing, negotiating and performing such contracts.

230 The accuracy, relevance and predictability of AI in law is enhanced with
 231 detail provided in cases and judgments derived from experienced experts who
 232 can provide heuristics based on probability assessments. Legal ontologies are
 233 improved with experience. Baker argues for the superiority of experiential
 234 learning, citing creation of AI ontologies ex post as inferior source of for
 235 human learning (Baker 1994).



236 **6. Toward Commercial Law as an Optimal Blend of Formal Specificity**
 237 **and Reliable Compilation of Experience**

238 Although this may soon change, few statutes have ever been written
 239 intending to be searched, analyzed or modified by computers, other than with
 240 simple word processors. The benefits of having a domain designed with
 241 modular organization are simply non-existent in most national laws and
 242 highly unlikely to be constructed in the near to medium term for industrial-
 243 ized nations. Blackwel argues for the benefits of object-oriented analysis
 244 and design in AI as an ideal structure for analysis of problems involving
 245 “complex relationships among distinct concepts. [Such a] structure will allow
 246 close consistency with both the real-world situations addressed, and the legal
 247 principles applied, by the statute” (Blackwel 1999).

248 Nevertheless, the organization of some statutes transcends the hodge-
 249 podge, historical accumulation of political compromises often typified by the
 250 Internal Revenue Code in the U.S. Indeed, the Law Merchant and its
 251 progeny, the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), separately legislated
 252 by all 50 U.S. state legislatures, is a model of two important factors that may
 253 improve its potential for adaptation through ontologies into AI systems.
 254 First, the UCC is composed of well-organized rules derived from best
 255 practice experience from centuries of actual conduct. The UCC is therefore a
 256 codification following practice significantly bridging the gap between pre-
 257 scribed conduct and actual behavior. As a result, an ontology based on the
 258 UCC is already more robust because it includes many details from experi-
 259 ence. Second, the UCC has a form of modular composition, again derived
 260 from experience, enabling manageable analysis and ontological representa-
 261 tion. The CISG is very similar to the UCC, and increasingly promises to
 262 apply the benefits of this model’s generality to the sale of international goods
 263 and the ecommerce commerce domains.

264 **7. Our Model Transformation**

265 In day to day legal practice, processes are derived from both the existing law,
 266 from experience, and from various cultural, political, and economic factors.
 267 When the law must be applied to new areas, such as ecommerce, the law relies
 268 on both extending past standards and on incorporating new business prac-
 269 tices through a case-by-case “learning” process. We believe that both
 270 approaches are naturally linked, and that they must be for the semantic web
 271 vision to be achieved in the area of contract law. As our first step, we focused
 272 on building a composite “lawyer’s ontology” refined with law from actual
 273 practice because of the unique hybrid capabilities offered by the US-based
 274 UCC commerce code.






Figure 1. Example of UCC-derived Term Definition for the term Merchant.

275 The starting point for our work is a series of UCC-based expert systems
 276 built in the late 1980's (Bagby 1987). These expert systems evaluate contract
 277 performance, and suggest possible remedies for various kinds of non-per-
 278 formance. They are used by lawyers and commercial contracting profes-
 279 sionals (e.g., purchasing managers, sales staff) who understand basic domain
 280 concepts such that every contract involves a buyer and seller, each of whom
 281 can be either merchants or non-merchants, and so forth. Thus our first step in
 282 transforming these expert systems into knowledge-based systems requires
 283 incorporating the de jure formal terms and rules in the UCC Article II into a
 284 legal ontology.

285 We developed our ontology using the OWL Web Ontology Language⁴ in
 286 Protégé (Noy et al. 2001), an open-source development environment for
 287 ontologies. An OWL plugin, provided in the Protégé download, extends the
 288 Protégé development environment to support OWL. When possible, we
 289 document each term's usage in UCC Article II by its section number. In
 290 Figure 1, we show the paraphrased description for the term Merchant and its
 291 UCC citation [UCC 2-104]. Ideally, in the future, we would be able link to a
 292 Legal Dictionary such as LEXML⁵ the European Legal RDF Dictionary.
 293 Figure 2 shows our current prototype UCC ontology displayed graphically.
 294 Our next step is to drive the development of the ontology using a hypo-
 295 thetical case, see Section 8 below.

296 8. Testing the Ontology Using Simulation

297 In this section, we test the ontology using a hypothetical derived from a
 298 influential, watershed case in electronic licensing for software "products."
 299 Simulation using legal ontologies is a useful tool to (1) assess the robustness
 300 of the ontology, (2) identify weaknesses with a view to iterative refinement of






Figure 2. Prototype UCC Article II Ontology.

301 the ontology and (3) provide data that indicate promising points of departure
 302 for the developing and maturing ontology's expansion into related subject
 303 areas. The hypothetical used here serves to achieve some progress towards all
 304 three of these objectives.

305 Simulated testing can be performed on legal ontologies by using three
 306 broad types of data. The first category are real cases that can be briefed
 307 and coded for simulation. Real cases are generally taken from publicly-
 308 available and published reporters. In the U.S., these are law books orga-
 309 nized under standardized citation methods and are generally available from
 310 various public sources. These public sources represent the deciding justice's
 311 written account of the procedural case history, facts, decided legal issues
 312 and rationale/justification that settle actual disputes between revealed par-
 313 ties and appear "in the public record." The traditional method to archive
 314 decided cases and make them available publicly is through print publication
 315 generally available in most public and private law libraries as well as in
 316 various print archives (e.g., public and federal depository libraries).
 317 Increasingly, most such (print) published cases as well as many "unpub-
 318 lished" cases are available electronically through various proprietary online
 319 information services (e.g., Lexis, Westlaw), proprietary archival online
 320 information services (e.g., CCH, Prentice-Hall, Sweet and Maxwell) and
 321 various electronic public domain collections typically available online at law
 322 schools and special interest organizations. Electronic resources show great
 323 promise for large scale simulation testing of legal ontologies because their
 324 largely digital archiving of ascii formatted text in natural language permit
 325 key word in context and Boolean search useful in preparing such cases for
 326 coding. Many such electronic collections of decided "real" cases are
 327 indexed and summarized according to long-term persistent subject taxo-
 328 nomies widely used among legal practitioners. For example, some electronic
 329 collections include cases in relational databases that are organized into
 330 fields (e.g., jurisdiction, dates, parties, counsel, judges, subject of law, dis-
 331 sentsing opinions) and are susceptible to deployment of innovations using
 332 other search techniques.

333 Real cases may be most useful to test the legal ontologies in two contexts.
 334 First, real cases can test the robustness of the ontologies when presumed to
 335 be "correctly" decided. Under this method, cases without logical flaws or
 336 inappropriately applied law assist in identifying and correcting the logic of
 337 the ontology. Second, sufficiently revised and debugged legal ontologies can
 338 be used to identify and correct real cases decided with logical flaws or
 339 inappropriately applied law. This method is useful to identify systematic
 340 biases in case outcomes unique to particular influences possibly due to factors
 341 such as a particular state's law, particular judges (hanging judge), particular
 342 litigants, counsel or expert witnesses, jury selection methods, litigation
 343 consultants, perhaps even the role of publicity to channel outcomes. Of
 344 course, to enable both contexts, there will persist a pivotal issue as to the
 345 correctness in the deciding of cases.

346 The second broad types of data useful in simulations using legal ontolo-
 347 gies are "pure hypotheticals." These are cases not directly derived from real



348 cases, but are composed and invented cases that serve several important
 349 purposes, many of which are derived from the original Socratic method. Pure
 350 hypotheticals permit simulation when no or too few real cases have ever yet
 351 reached a particular node or decision point. This enables a much larger set of
 352 alternative to be examined and enables the exploration of complex combi-
 353 nations of factors useful in planning. For example, pure hypotheticals can be
 354 constructed to fairly closely parallel a novel but planned transaction. Simu-
 355 lations thus used for planning promise to endow robust ontologies with
 356 powerful forecasting accuracy. Thus there are clear benefits to users to fully
 357 vent before committing to transaction or publicity (goodwill) risks. Expert
 358 systems and other artificial intelligence researchers have long promised such
 359 planning benefits.

360 The third broad type of data useful in simulations using legal ontologies is
 361 used here – a hybrid of the first two, herein called “real case enhanced
 362 hypotheticals.” We chose to combine the benefits of real cases and hypothet-
 363 icals by re-writing a real case to include additional, but hypothetical
 364 factors, to create the hybrid. The real case enhanced hypothetical used here is
 365 based on the *Netscape v. Specht* eCommerce contracting case described and
 366 “briefed” as follows:

367 Netscape’s SmartDownload facility had no requirement that the user
 368 must through an agreement button to view terms and conditions before
 369 beginning the download. Other Netscape functions or products required
 370 agreement before downloading. Netscape’s software captured private
 371 information about users’ surfing habits, arguably in violation of federal
 372 electronic surveillance privacy rights.

373 *Legal Issue.* Are arbitration provisions in Web site terms and conditions
 374 enforceable against users if they are not clearly directed to assent to such
 375 terms?

376 *Opinion.* On-line contracting is subject to traditional contract formation
 377 rules requiring knowing acceptance of terms. The Uniform Commercial
 378 Code applies to software download contracts. Click-wrap and shrink-
 379 wrap contracts are enforceable because the user manifests assent clicking
 380 through the “I accept” box. However, no clear click-wrap or shrink-wrap
 381 agreement between Netscape and users of Smart Download. Users were
 382 not required to manifest assent terms before downloading. Netscape used
 383 a mere invitation to visit terms on a linked page, was not enough to alert
 384 users that these terms were a condition to downloading. The act of
 385 downloading is not an unequivocal indication of assent; it is more like
 386 accepting a free sample (Bagby 2002).



387 In this case, the first essential step is the choice of law. But this depends on
 388 whether the software is classified as a good, a service, or as a licensing of
 389 content. For a software vendor, or a consumer, the choice of law can result in
 390 quite different outcomes. In the U.S., the UCC only applies if the subject
 391 matter is goods, and not to services (use common law) or licenses (use
 392 UCITA or UCITA-like code). When software subject matter (e.g., good,
 393 service, licensing of content) is known, then the system can select the
 394 appropriate choice of law to evaluate the contract and its potential weak-
 395 nesses. Alternatively, the user may wish to consider what happens if their
 396 software contract is evaluated under a different subject matter, and thus a
 397 different choice of law. This might lead them to market the software as a
 398 service or a license instead of a product, or vice versa. Below we describe our
 399 first simple steps in supporting this kind of recommendation analysis.

400 While our OWL ontology allows us to classify instances, it does not allow
 401 us to inference, or reason, over the classes. We use Jess (Eriksson 2003), a Java
 402 expert system shell, to reason over our ontology. Protégé provides a JessTab
 403 plugin⁶ that maps ontologies into Jess. Once the ontology has been repre-
 404 sented in Jess, we can use inference rules to derive choice of law requirements,
 405 see Figure 3. JessTab extends Jess with functions, such as *mapclass*, that map
 406 a Protégé ontology into Jess facts, and properties, see Figure 4 for Contract
 407 properties, into Jess slots. Jess also provides functions for manipulating
 408 Protégé knowledge bases. One example of such a function is *class-subclasses*,
 409 which returns the Jess facts that are the subclasses of a given class.

410 From our hypothetical case above, users with (1) a contract with subject
 411 matter of *Good*, have a choice of law *UCC*, or (2) any contract for which the
 412 users want to apply *UCC* laws must have a subject matter of *Good*. Clearly
 413 the ontology and Jess rules applies for similar questions about when to apply

```
(mapclass ChoiceOfLaw)
(mapclass Contract)
(mapclass Packaging)
(mapclass SubjectMatter)
...
(defrule hypothetical-from-Netscape-v-Specht
  ?c <- (object (is-a :(instance-of ?c Contract))
        (hasPackaging ?pk) (hasChoiceOfLaw nil)(hasSubjectMatter nil))
  (test (> (length$ (class-subclasses (class ?pk))) 0))
  =>
  (bind ?pk_subclass (class-subclasses (class ?pk) inherit))
  (recommend-hypotheticals ?c ?pk ?pk_subclass))
```

Figure 3. Example of mapping classes to Jess + Jess rule.






Figure 4. OWL Contract properties.

414 common law (land or services), UCITA (licensing of content), or any other
 415 *ChoiceOfLaw* encoded into the ontology. In the case of software, *Packaging*
 416 determines the subject matter, and hence the choice of law. In the case of
 417 software, packaging includes *EPROM* (e.g., software included on an EPROM
 418 in a car), *ASP_WebServices*, and *DiskInBox*, where EPROM packaging has a
 419 subject matter of goods, *ASP_WebServices* has services, and *DiskInBox* has
 420 license. Of course, other factors such as Jurisdiction play a role in deter-
 421 mining the subject matter, and we will expand to include additional factors in
 422 future versions.

423 Figure 5 shows an example of the contract *contract1* after the user has
 424 selected *hasPackaging* of *EPROM_1*. Using the Jess rules above, the system
 425 will then set *hasSubjectMatter* property to *Good* and *hasChoiceOfLaw* to
 426 *UCC*. At that point the system can analyze the contract using the UCC
 427 contract requirements. However, suppose the user does not realize the impact
 428 that different packaging can have on the final legal choice of law. In this case,
 429 the user would select the higher level packaging of Software. Since software
 430 can be either a good, service, or license, depending on how it is packaged, the
 431 system informs the user of the possible choices, see Figure 6. The user can
 432 then explore the implications resulting from those selections. We are cur-
 433 rently working on supporting the user in this selection process by providing
 434 information about pros and cons of each choice and highlighting relevant
 435 cases (such as *Netscape v. Spacht*).

436 9. Conclusion

437 In this paper, we describe our initial research investigation into representing
 438 the UCC commercial laws as a legal ontology. Once this work is completed,






Figure 5. User selects *hasPackaging* of *EPROM_1*: Before and after inferencing.




Figure 6. User is informed via Jess about possible Choice of Law options.

439 the authors plan on extending the UCC commercial laws into the emerging
 440 rules of electronic commerce with a view to examining the implications to
 441 planning, execution, and dispute resolution for electronic commerce trans-
 442 actions. For example, three frameworks in international commerce appear to
 443 be natural objects to extend this method. First, the Vienna Conventional for
 444 the International Sale of Goods (CISG) has many notable similarities to the
 445 Law Merchant, Lex Mercatoria and the UCC particularly as compendiums of
 446 successful actual practice. Second, several sources of electronic commerce
 447 laws have been implemented in the European Union and the United States.
 448 For example, the EU Directive in Electronic Commerce (Dir 2000/31/EC)
 449 and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) are developing suffi-
 450 cient rigor to deserve attention, particularly given their focus on automated
 451 transactions, concluded by electronic means including electronic agent

452 activities. Follow on work will address the impact of deploying intelligent
 453 software agents as full-fledged legal persons engaged in these types of
 454 transactions.

455 Notes

- 456 ¹ www.uml.org
 457 ² www.w3.org/TR/daml+oil-reference
 458 ³ www.ruleml.org
 459 ⁴ www.w3.org/2001/sw/webont
 460 ⁵ www.lexml.de/rdf.htm
 461 ⁶ <http://www.ida.liu.se/~her/JessTab/>

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